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Less than three years ago the Supreme Court, in Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,' construed the statute of limitations for
antitrust damage actions contained in section 4B of the Clayton Act.2
In the brief period since then, courts and commentators have adopted
three widely divergent interpretations of that ambiguous opinion and
thus of the statute.3 This nonuniform construction of a statute, by
which Congress intended to create a uniform statute of limitations4
makes a careful examination of Zenith desirable. This article under-
takes that examination and goes further. After determining the proper
meaning of Zenith, it examines the language and legislative history of
section 4B and concludes that Zenith rests upon an erroneous interpre-
tation of the statute, has serious adverse consequences, and should be
overruled.
I. Zenith AND THE ACCRUAL OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
UNDER SECTION 4B OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Hazeltine Research, Inc., sued Zenith Radio Corporation in 1959
for patent infringement.5 In 1963 Zenith counterclaimed for damages
suffered between 1959 and 1963 as a result of alleged antitrust viola-
tions by HRI between 1943 and 1963, related to HRI's domestic patent
licensing practices6 and its participation in patent pools that prevented
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Kansas Law School.
#- Member, Kansas State Bar.
1 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
2 Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1970).
3 See text and notes at notes 24-42 infra.
4 See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955); H.R. REP. No. 422, 84th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 (1955).
5 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. In. 1965). The
patent in issue involved an automatic contrast control system for television sets. For more
information on this apparatus than one could possibly want, see id. at 54-68.
6 HRI offered a standard package license under which the licensee would be free for
five years from suit by HRI for patent infringement. In return the licensee paid royalties
on its entire production line regardless of whether any HRI patents were used in produc-
tion. Zenith was an HRI licensee until 1959, but, when Zenith refused to renew its license,
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the importation of radio and television products into three foreign
countries.7 The district court found Zenith innocent of patent infringe-
ment 8 and awarded damages on the counterclaim for HRI's antitrust
violations both in the United States and in the foreign patent pools.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the award as to the foreign patent pools
on the ground that Zenith had failed to prove that it had been injured
during the four years prior to the bringing of the suit.9 The Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that the fact of injury resulting from the
Canadian pool had been adequately proved,10 but that the case should
be remanded to the court of appeals for a consideration of certain de-
fenses raised by HRI after the entry of judgment."
One of the defenses considered by the Seventh Circuit on remand
was that the trial court should not have awarded the entire amount of
HRI then tried to force Zenith to take the package license rather than licenses only for
the patents actually used. This attempt, and the method of computing royalties, formed
the foundation for a claim that HRI's domestic licensing practices violated the antitrust
laws. See id. at 69-72.
7 The three countries were Canada, Great Britain, and Australia. The British patent
pool is typical; the major radio and electronics firms in Great Britain, including HRI,
pooled their patents and agreed that licenses could be granted only by the pool. The pool
granted only package licenses for the manufacture of products in Great Britain. Thus, for
Zenith to sell radio and television products in Great Britain without fear of patent
infringement suits, it would have to set up a manufacturing plant in Great Britain. See
id. at 72-73.
8 The trial court held that Zenith had not infringed the HRI patent and that, in any
event, the patent was invalid on the grounds of prior publication, prior public use, and
failure to present a patentable invention in light of the prior art. Id. at 68. The finding
of invalidity was affirmed by the court of appeals, 388 F.2d 25, 30-33 (7th Cir. 1967), and
was not in issue before the Supreme Court, 395 U.S. 100, 105 (1969).
9 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967). As to the Australian pool, the court of appeals found that
government regulations had prevented sales in Australia before 1960, that Zenith had not
attempted to obtain an import license from the pool after 1960, and that high import
duties and shipping costs were barriers to Zenith's entry into the Australian market. The
court thus held no damages had been proved for the 1959-1963 period. Id. at 36. An
embargo prevented sales in Great Britain until 1959. Further, Great Britain used a 405-
line scanning signal in its television transmission, while Zenith only makes 525- and 625-
line scanning signals. As a result, the failure of Zenith to capture a share of the British
market in 1959-1963 was not due to the patent pool. Id. at 36-37. In Canada, Zenith had
sold 65,000 radios and 60,000 televisions during the damage period; there was no evidence
of threatened litigation against Zenith's distributors in Canada. On this basis the court
held that the fact of damages during 1959-1963 had not been proved with respect to the
Canadian market. Id. at 37-38.
10 395 U.S. 100 (1969). The Court held that the policing activities of the Canadian pool
-warning notices to distributors, dealers, and consumers and threatened patent infringe-
ment suits-were sufficient to prove some damages during 1959-1963. It also held that
some damage resulted from acts performed within four years of the counterclaim, thus
avoiding the statute of limitations problem. Id. at 114-25. The rulings on the British and
Australian pools, however, were upheld. Id. at 125-29.
11 Id. at 117 & n.13.
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damages suffered by Zenith during the four-year period preceding its
1963 counterclaim, because the four-year statute of limitations for
private antitrust actions barred recovery of damages caused by conduct
occurring more than four years before the filing of the counterclaim. 12
Zenith had contended in the district court that HRI had waived the
statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it until after the ad-
verse judgment.13 The Seventh Circuit held that the statute of limita-
tions defense had not been waived, 14 but the Supreme Court again re-
versed.15 The Court first held that a related government action filed
in 1958 and terminated in 1962 had tolled the statute of limitations
against HRI for all of its antitrust violations in the Canadian market
since 1954.16 Because HRI had participated in the Canadian patent
12 Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1970). Another defense raised by HRI was that
liability for damages from pre-1957 conduct was barred by a release that Zenith gave in
settlement of a claim brought against RCA, General Electric, and Western Electric. The
court of appeals held that Zenith had released HRI by not expressly reserving its rights
against HRI, because HRI was an unnamed coconspirator with the defendants in that
action. 418 F.2d 21, 24 (7th Cir. 1969). The Supreme Court, however, concluded that HRI
was not protected by the release, holding that a release protects only those whom the
releasing party intends to release. 401 U.S. 321, 347-48 (1971).
13 401 U.S. at 329. HRI did not assert the statute of limitations defense until one year
after trial, at which tinle it had already learned that the trial court's ruling would be
unfavorable. See 401 U.S. at 327. The district court, however, allowed HRI to file these
contentions as of the date of argument so that they technically were filed prior to judg-
ment. 401 U.S. at 329 n.3.
14 The case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of which damages were
caused by HRI's conduct before 1959 and therefore excluded. 418 F.2d at 24-26.
15 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971). The Court held
that it was not an abuse of discretion to reject the limitations defense on the ground of
waiver; the Court then discussed whether the damage award would have been modified if
the defense had been raised at the proper time.
16 The government filed an antitrust action on November 24, 1958, against certain
American companies that participated in the Canadian pool along with HRI. This action
was terminated by a consent decree on November 1, 1962. The Clayton Act provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to
prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not including
an action under section 4A, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of
every private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or in part on
any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency
thereof and for one year thereafter.
Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). Thus, the running of the statute of limita-
tions was suspended from November 24, 1958, to November 1, 1963. See 401 U.S. at 333-
34 nn.5 & 6.
This holding that the statute of limitations was tolled as to a party not named in the
government action has been criticized as violating the policies of the statute of limitations.
A company not liamed in the government's suit may not be on notice that the statute of
limitations had been tolled and thus might not have taken care to preserve evidence
needed for an adequate defense. See, e.g., Note, 21 J. PUB. L. 203, 211 (1972); Note, 38 J.
Am L. & Com. 67, 73-74 (1972) (recognizing that the problem of lack of notice may be
minimal because corporate awareness in industries under investigation by the government
leads nonparties to preserve necessary records). An earlier lower court opinion had also
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pool since 1943, the Court then considered the question of whether
damages suffered during 1959-1963 but caused by HRI's pre-1954
acts could be recovered. The answer turned on a construction of sec-
tion 4B of the Clayton Act, which states that any suit for damages re-
sulting from an antitrust violation "shall be forever barred unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued."' 7 If,
as Hazeltine contended, the cause of action accrued at the time of the
act giving rise to damages, all damages attributable to pre-1954 conduct
would have been barred.
The Court rejected Hazeltine's construction, but its own interpreta-
tion of the statute is somewhat ambiguous. The Court stated that the
general rule in antitrust cases is that "each time a plaintiff is injured
by an act of the defendants a cause of action accrues to him to recover
the damages caused by that act and that, as to those damages, the statute
of limitations runs from the commission of the act."' 8 The first part of
this formulation indicates that the cause of action accrues when the plain-
tiff is injured, but the second part of the Court's formulation provides
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the commission of
the actionable conduct. The two parts of this rule can be harmonized
only when the antitrust violation and the injury occur simultaneously.' 9
The Court also stated that, although each separate. cause of action
entitles a plaintiff to recover damages suffered at the date of accrual
and also those damages that will be suffered in the future, the plaintiff
cannot recover if the fact of the damages' accrual is too speculative or
their amount and nature unprovable. The Court then stated that, be-
cause this refusal to award future profits as too speculative is the
equivalent of holding that no cause of action has accrued for dam-
ages not already suffered, in these instances "the cause of action for
future damages, if they ever occur, will accrue only on the date they
are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue to recover them at any
time within four years from the date they were inflicted." 20 The con-
applied the tolling provision to defendants not named in a government action. Michigan
v. Morton Salt Co., 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966), aff'd sub nom., Hardy Salt Co. v.
Illinois, 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967). See Comment, Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act: The
Tolling Effect of Government Antitrust Actions on Unnamed Parties, 34 U. CHI. L. RiEv.
906 (1967) (generally favorable to Morton Salt); Note, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1661 (1967) (crit-
icizing the decision). See also Note, Clayton Act Provision-A New Interpretation, 23
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 353 (1966) (questioning the propriety of tolling the statute of limita-
tions during government suits).
17 Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1970).
18 401 U.S. at 338.
19 For example, in a pricefixing case the initial purchasers are injured at the same time
the defendants sell to them at the illegally fixed price; but subsequent purchasers in the
distributional chain are injured after the illegal act was committed.
20 401 U.S. at 339.
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fusion in the opinion is increased by this use of two definitions of
accrual within one sentence.
The final element of ambiguity in Zenith is that neither the "suf-
fered" test nor the "inflicted" test 1 describes the manner in which the
Court applied section 4B to the facts of the case. The accrual date
adopted cannot have been the date of infliction, since that standard
would mean that a cause of action accrues when the act giving rise to
damages occurs, and the Court clearly intended to reject this rule
as to claims for future damages. The "suffered" test, while not clearly
an incorrect reading of Zenith, is also inconsistent with the Court's ap-
proach. If the date on which the injury was actually suffered had been
determinative, the Court could simply have observed that the damages
awarded to Zenith and challenged on appeal had all been suffered
within the past four years; but it did not do so.
The approach actually employed by the Court was to ask whether
the 1959-1963 damages would have been held speculative in 1954-
because of the tolling by the government suit, the earliest date on
which a cause of action could have accrued without being barred by
the statute of limitations. 22 Thus, despite contrary language, the Court
in fact held that a cause of action for damages arising from an antitrust
violation accrues when the damages cease to be speculative.
This holding, that accrual depends on the time damages become as-
certainable rather than when they are in fact suffered, has more than
semantic significance. When an antitrust violation gives rise to future
damages-generally anticipated lost profits-the suffering and ascer-
tainability of the damages may not occur simultaneously. For example,
assume that a conspiracy to exclude the plaintiff from a particular
market ends in 1980 and that the plaintiff, as a new entrant, gains one
percent of the market in 1981. Since the measure of damages is the
difference between actual profits and what would have been earned
absent the violation,23 damages for 1981 would be the difference be-
tween what the plaintiff's profits would have been had its entry not
been impeded prior to 1981 and the profits actually earned. In 1981,
21 The distinction between the two tests the Court mixes together can be demonstrated
by a simple hypothetical. Assume that the actionable conduct occurs in 1970, giving rise
to future damages. Under the "inflicted" test, the cause of action for profits lost in 1974
would accrue in 1970 when the actionable conduct occurred. Section 4B would thus bar
suits filed after 1974. Under the "suffered" test, however, a cause of action for lost profits
would not accrue until 1975, and the plantiff could sue in 1979.
22 401 U.S. at 340-2.
23 See Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 F. 810 (3d Cir. 1921). Courts have
not applied this requirement strictly. See Comment, Proof Requirements in Anti-Trust
Suits: The Obstacles to Treble Damage Recovery, 18 U. Cm. L. REv. 180, 13"--5 (1950).
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however, it may be impossible to determine with sufficient precision
the market share the plaintiff would have had by that time in a freely
competitive market. The extent of the plaintiff's damages therefore
may not be ascertainable until the court has a sufficiently definite
standard against which to measure damages, which might not occur,
until the plaintiff achieves his maximum share of a freely competitive
market. Under these facts the plaintiff would have to sue by 1985 if
his cause of action accrues when damages are actually suffered. If the
cause of action accrues when the damages cease to be speculative, how-
ever, and if, for example, the plaintiff's share of a freely competitive
market cannot be ascertained until 1990 he need not sue until 1994.
The potential effect of the Zenith holding is thus a significant exten-
sion of the effective statute of limitations.
II. REACTIONS BY THE COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
Even if a cause of action for private antitrust damages accrues at
the time the claimed damages become nonspeculative, substantial con-
fusion still remains about the precise nature of the test set forth in
Zenith. In fact, three interpretations of the Court's opinion have
already been proposed by the courts and commentators.
A. The Threshold Test
The first interpretation, or the threshold test 24 construes Zenith to
require that two conditions be satisfied before damages can be re-
covered more than four years after the actionable act. The court must
initially determine that the damages in question would have been held
speculative if suit had been brought four years after the act causing
the damages. If that threshold is met, recovery is then allowed only
when suit is brought less than four years after the damages become
nonspeculative.25
A requirement that future damages be speculative four years after
the actionable conduct might be consistent with the result in Zenith,
but the Court never articulated such a standard. The Court asked only
whether the 1959-1963 damages were speculative in 1954,26 while
under the threshold test it would have been necessary to ask whether
that part of the 1959-1963 damages attributable to 1943 violations2 7
was speculative in 1947, whether that portion attributable to 1944 vio-
24 Professor Milton Handler is the most noted proponent of this two-pronged test. See
Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. Ruv. 1 (1972).
25 Id. at 49-50; Note, 38 J. Am L. & Cozi. 67, 77-78 (1972).
26 See 401 U.S. at 340.
27 The continuing violation began in 1943. 239 F. Supp. at 74.
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lations was speculative in 1948, and so forth. Although the finding
that the 1959-1963 damages caused by pre-1954 violations were specu-
lative in 1954 implies that those damages were also speculative in every
year prior to 1954, the Court gave no indication that its single refer-
ence point was shorthand for a more complex test.
Further, the substantial possibility of absurd results indicates that
the Court did not intend to adopt the threshold test. Suppose that an
antitrust violation is committed on January 1, 1970, that the dam-
ages cease to be speculative on December 81, 1973, and that the plain-
tiff sues on March 1, 1974. Although the plaintiff meets the second
part of the threshold test by suing within four years after his damages
cease to be speculative, the case would be dismissed for failing to meet
the threshold test. The damages are not speculative four years after the
actionable conduct, even though they are speculative three years and
364 days after the act. If, on the other hand, the violation occurs on
January 1, 1970, but the damages are not judicially ascertainable until
January 2, 1974, he could sue any time before January 2, 1978. These
two hypotheticals obviously represent the extremes, but similarly un-
just disparities would be likely whenever the damages become ascer-
tainable a short time before the first four years expire and there is in-
sufficient time to prepare a case and file a complaint.28 The threshold
test should therefore be rejected.
B. A Judicial Interpretation
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit articulated another
interpretation of Zenith in Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc.:29 "[A] plaintiff
in an antitrust action may recover damages occurring within the stat-
utory limitations period that are the result of conduct occurring prior
to that period if, at the time of the conduct, those damages were specu-
lative, uncertain, or otherwise incapable of proof."30
In this formulation of the rule, it is necessary to ask only whether
the damages were speculative at the time of the actionable conduct;
the question of when the damages ceased to be speculative is never
28 This hypothetical, and the analysis of this article, obviously depends on the court's
ability to fix objectively the precise date on which the damages became nonspeculative.
29 448 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1971). A distributor of chemical products claimed treble damages
for profits lost due to the termination in 1963 of his distributorship for failure to comply
with illegal resale price maintenance and territorial restrictions. He sued on May 31, 1968,
dearly more than four years after the allegedly illegal conduct. The trial court held that
the entire claim was barred by the statute of limitations. 306 F. Supp. 541, 569 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
30 448 F.2d at 884.
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reached. The significance of this interpretation, and the way in which
it differs from the threshold test, can be seen in a hypothetical example.
Assume that an antitrust violation is committed in 1970 and causes
future damages that at that time are speculative; the extent of the
damages ceases to be speculative in 1973, and the plaintiff sues in
1990. The Ansul test would not bar recovery in the 1970 suit of dam-
ages occurring between 1986 and 1990-because the damages were
speculative when the actionable conduct occurred-even though they
were ascertainable seventeen years before suit was brought.
Although the Ansul interpretation might be a permissible inference
from Zenith, its results would be undesirable. Ansul permits the victim
of an illegal act committed in 1970 to sue in 1990 for all injuries suf-
fered between 1986 and 1990, without regard to when the damages
became ascertainable, if the damages were speculative in 1970. This
rule makes a shambles of the policies underlying statutes of limita-
tions.31 The hypothetical plaintiff could recover damages by proving
an illegal act that had occurred many years prior to suit, and witnesses
and evidence essential to determine the truth might by then be un-
available. Further, one who has committed a violation would not be
free from suit until four years after the last possible injury caused
by the violation has occurred.32 As a result, a potential defendant might
feel obliged to maintain unusual liquidity against future damage
awards, rather than employing its resources in the most efficient man-
ner, a problem that is exacerbated by a potential defendant's inability
to determine the extent of its potential liability.3 3 In addition, the
ability to raise capital might be adversely affected by the prospect of
indefinite liability for antitrust damages. Since the sole basis for ex-
tending the statute of limitations when damages are not ascertainable
is to give the injured parties a reasonable chance to recover, there is
no compelling reason to extend the limitations period beyond four
years from the date on which damages become ascertainable.
31 A classic statement of these policies-disfavor for stale claims in which important
evidence has been lost and avoidance of surprise on the part of one who has committed
an act far in the past-is in Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944). See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, rehearing
denied, 325 U.S. 896 (1945); text at notes 37-42 infra.
32 This prospect will tend to negate the function of the statute of limitations as a
vehicle of repose. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, rehearing denied,
325 U.S. 896 (1945); Levy v. Stewart, 78 U.S. (11 Wail.) 244, 249 (1870).
33 See Note, 21 J. PuB. L. 203, 211-12 (1972); Comment, Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act:
The Tolling Effect of Government Antitrust Actions on Unnamed Parties, supra note 16,
at 913-14 (1967).
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C. The Accurate Interpretation
A third interpretation of Zenith, employed by several courts,3 4 is
that a cause of action accrues only after the amount of future dam-
ages ceases to be speculative, and suit must be brought within four
years of that date.35 Under this "ascertainability test," if an antitrust
violation occurred in 1970, damages ceased to be speculative in 1973,
and suit were brought in 1975, the case would be dismissed under the
threshold test but not under this third reading of Zenith. The inequi-
ties caused by the threshold test when damages become nonspecula-
tive slightly less than four years after the actionable conduct are thus
eliminated.36
Although this interpretation of Zenith is clearly preferable to the
threshold test from a policy viewpoint, the more restrictive recovery
of the Ansiti rule37 may suggest that Ansul is the most desirable of the
three readings. Suppose that allegedly illegal conduct occurs in 1970
when future damages are speculative. If damages caused by that con-
duct occur in 1971 but are not judicially ascertainable until 1980,
Ansul would bar recovery of the 1971 damages in an action initiated
after 1975; but the third reading of Zenith would permit recovery of
those damages in any suit brought by 1984. Ansul is thus less destruc-
tive of the policies underlying statutes of limitations than is this read-
ing of Zenith whenever the damages resulting from an antitrust vio-
lation actually occur before they become ascertainable.
The ascertainability standard nevertheless appears to have been in-
tended by the Court. First, promotion of the underlying policies of
statutes of limitations was not given any significant weight by the
Court. The Court focused its attention predominantly upon the role
of treble damage actions in antitrust enforcement38  and concluded
that extension of the limitations period to facilitate private recoveries
was desirable. This solicitous attitude toward private plaintiffs indi-
. 34 Continental-Wirt Elec. Corp. v. Lancaster Glass Corp., 459 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1972);
Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 456 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1972); Railing v.
UMW, 445 F.2d 353 (4th Cir. 1971).
35 This rule is the threshold test without the objectionable threshold requirement that
the damages be speculative four years after the commission of the actionable conduct. See
text at note 25 supra.
36 See text at note 28 supra. With this test, there is no difference in treatment caused by
the fortuity of whether the damages become nonspeculative shortly before or shortly after
the passage of four years from the commission of the violation.
37 Under this rule, recovery is limited to damages occurring less than four years prior
to suit. In the hypothetical in the text, if the plaintiff brought suit in 1976, for example,
he could recover only those damages occurring since 1972.
38 See text at notes 43-44 infra.
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cates that the Court, if presented with the issue, would have rejected
the Ansul test.
In addition, Ansul is consistent with the Court's handling of the
facts of Zenith only if the Court, without any indication, was telescop-
ing a complicated factual inquiry into a simple shorthand.39 Further,
Ansul focuses primarily on the date on which damages were suffered 40
and thus is inconsistent with the emphasis in Zenith on postponing the
running of the statute of limitations to alleviate the adverse effects of
delayed ascertainability of damages in antitrust actions.41 The only
language in Zenith that might support this concentration on the date
of occurrence rather than on the date of ascertainability in defining
accrual does not appear to have been intended to do so.4 2
The determination of the accurate interpretation of Zenith does not
solve the problem, however, because none of the three interpretations
is supported by the legislative history of section 4B of the Clayton
Act or by policy considerations.
III. SECTION 4B OF THE CLAYTON ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Because the precise issue presented in Zenith was a construction of
the four-year limitation period in section 4B of the Clayton Act, the
Court should have focused on congressional intent. The only discus-
sion of this topic in the opinion, however, is a statement of the con-
gressional purposes that private actions be "a bulwark of antitrust en-
forcement" and that antitrust laws "protect the victims of the for-
39 The Court determined that Zenith's counterclaim was not barred because the damages
from pre-1954 conduct were speculative in 1954. 401 U.S. at 340-41. To apply the Ansul
test, it would be necessary to determine whether damages attributable to 1943 acts were
speculative in 1943, whether those caused by 1944 acts were speculative in 1944, and so on.
The same weakness was presented by the threshold test. See text at notes 26-27 supra.
40 Even though Ansul requires a threshold determination that the damages were specu-
lative on the date of the illegal conduct, the determinative date for the running of the
four-year period is the occurrence of the damages and not ascertainability.
41 The Court felt that this new test for the accrual of a cause of action was justified
because "[o]therwise future damages that could not be proved within four years of the
conduct from which they flowed would be forever incapable of recovery .... " 401 U.S.
at 340. For example, if conduct gives rise to damages that are unascertainable in 1970
and those damages occur in 1971 but are not ascertainable until 1976, the statute of
limitations on the 1971 damages would have run in 1975, one year before they became
ascertainable.
42 The Court stated that "the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur,
will accrue only on the date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may sue to recover
them at any time within four years from the date they were inflicted." 401 U.S. at 339.
While the "suffered" language in that sentence might imply that the occurrence of the
damages fixes the date of accrual, the statement contains such internal contradictions and
ambiguities that it would be unwise to rely on it to interpret the Court's meaning. See
text at notes 18-21 supra.
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bidden practices as well as the public."43 In this context, the only rea-
son advanced in favor of the holding was that if treble damage actions
could not be filed within four years after damages become ascertain-
able, "future damages that could not be proved within four years of
the conduct from which they flowed would be forever incapable of
recovery, contrary to the congressional purpose.
' 44
Unfortunately, this statement of congressional purpose begs the
question. It is true that Congress provided a treble damage remedy to
private parties to deter antitrust violations and to compensate victims
of violations; but Congress also expressly limited the period in which
such actions could be brought. This limitation evidences a legislative
belief that at some point in time other considerations outweigh the
benefits of treble damage actions. The congressional purpose to be
determined concerns the point at which that limitation was intended
to take effect.45
Only one statement in the congressional debates on the proposed
statute of limitations expressly referred to the time at which the limita-
tions period begins to run, and that statement is somewhat ambiguous.
During the House debate Congressman Emanuel Celler, the principal
advocate of the bill, stated that "[i]n the case of conspiracy or fraud,
the statute only runs from the time of discovery. '14 6 Since this state-
ment was a reply to an inquiry whether the statute would bar a suit on
a conspiracy not discovered until ten years after the illegal conduct, it
probably means only that discovery must occur before the statute can
commence running. The statement thus leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of what must be discovered-the illegal conduct, the fact of injury
to the plaintiff caused by the illegal conduct, or the fact of injury and
illegal conduct together with judicially ascertainable damages.
Despite the ambiguity of this single direct comment on the limita-
tions period, other evidence suggests that Zenith does not follow con-
gressional intent. The House Committee expressed its concern that a
lengthy statute of limitations combined with the provision tolling the
statute during government actions47 would "prolong stale claims, un-
duly impair efficient business operations, and overburden the calendars
of courts. '48 The Senate Committee noted that unduly prolonged pro-
43 401 U.S. at 340.
44 Id. '
45 The statutory language provides no guidance. Although section 4B bars all actions
not commenced "within four years after the cause of action accrued," it does not define
"accrued."
46 101 CONG. Rac. 5129 (1955).
47 Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). See note 16 supra.
48 H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 4, at 8.
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ceedings would not be "conducive to effective and efficient enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws.' 49 These statements indicate that one pur-
pose of section 4B was to shorten the length of time antitrust actions
would burden defendants and the courts. The ascertainability standard
creates the opposite effect, however, by indefinitely extending the
period in which actions can be brought.50
In addition, the principal purpose of section 4B was to remedy the
situation created by Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. Atlanta,51
in which the Supreme Court held that private antitrust actions were
governed by state statutes of limitations.52 The result of this holding
had been "widespread variations from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as to
the time within which an injured party [could] institute such a suit,
as well as considerable confusion in ascertaining the applicable State
law."'53 Congress thus attempted to establish a uniform period and
chose a four-year period because the average state statute of limitations
in antitrust actions was approximately four years.5 4 If the primary pur-
pose of section 4B was to introduce uniformity and decrease uncer-
tainty, Zenith is not consistent with congressional intent.
Moreover, Congress expressed no dissatisfaction with the way the
states had determined when the applicable statutes of limitations began
to run and did not define a particular time at which antitrust actions
accrue. It is thus necessary to look to the generally accepted rules
governing that issue.
Although it is well established that statutes of limitations commence
running when a cause of action accrues,55 the multiplicity of ways in
which causes of action accrue has prevented the emergence of a single
rule governing the date on which all statutes of limitations begin to
run.5 6 Private antitrust actions can be brought only by a person "in-
jured in his business or property,"57 however, suggesting that the
applicable rule should be the one generally governing causes of action
40 S. RE I. No. 619, supra note 4, at 6.
50 Admittedly, the same effect is created by the discovery exception accepted by Congress.
See text at note 45 supra. These two possible exceptions can, however, be meaningfully
distinguished. See text and notes at note 78--80 infra.
51 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
52 See S. RrP. No. 619, supra note 4, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 4, at 7.
53 H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 4, at 1.
54 S. REP. No. 619, supra note 4, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 4, at 7. See 101
CONG. REc. 5129 (1955) (remarks of Congressman Celler).
55 See, e.g., United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414 (1938); Grayson v. Harris, 279 U.S.
300 (1929).
56 Compare, e.g., Yaffee v. Fort Smith Light & Traction Co., 159 Ark. 636, 252 S.M. 925
(1923), with Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N.E. 511 (1908).
57 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
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that require a showing of actual injury to the plaintiff as an element
of recovery.58
If the ascertainability test represented the law governing such causes
of action, the statutes of limitations would commence running on the
date the damages resulting from the actionable conduct become
judicially ascertainable in full; but no court has construed the appli-
cable statute of limitations in this manner. The courts have instead
held that where a showing of actual injury is a required element, a
cause of action accrues when actual injury can be shown, and the statute
of limitations begins to run at that time even though the ultimate ex-
tent of the damages is unknown and unpredictable. 9
A middle ground between Zenith and this generally adopted rule is
that, where a showing of actual damage is an element of the cause of ac-
tion, the statute of limitations begins to run when actual injury occurs
and some damages are judicially ascertainable.60 The statute of limita-
tions would thus begin to run when some, not necessarily all, of the
damage flowing from the actionable conduct becomes nonspeculative.
Under this test the Court in Zenith would have asked whether Zenith
could have proved nonspeculative damages in 1954 from the pre-1954
conduct for any period of time, not necessarily 1959-1963. An affirma-
tive answer would have necessitated dismissal of Zenith's claim. This
doctrine simply holds that factual injury is not legal injury until some
damages can be ascertained. This middle ground, however, has not been
adopted by any court.
Support for the ascertainability test is further diminished when
principles governing situations in which proof of actual damage is not
an element of a cause of action are considered. In those cases the
statutes begin to run on the date of the actionable conduct or when
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should discover the actionable con-
58 See, e.g., Kitchener v. Williams, 171 Kan. 540, 236 P.2d 64 (1951); White v.
Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941). For an explanation of how this class of
cases evolved despite the common law rule not requiring fact of injury as an element of
the cause of action, see C. McComucK, DAMAGES § 22 (1935).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 251 F.2d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1958).
60 This middle ground might appear at first glance to be equivalent to the actual injury
test under which a statute of limitations begins to run when there is both an violation
and actual injury. If a plaintiff could prove that he was injured in a conspiracy to exclude
him from the widget market, he could probably prove that he would have sold some
minimum number of widgets had he been allowed freely to enter the market, thus
establishing "some damages." These facts would provide no assistance, however, in deter-
mining the extent of the damages resulting from the violations; the damages depend on
whether he would have made a profit on the illegally prevented widget sales and what the
amount of that profit would have been.
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duct.61 This determination does not depend either on the fact of injury
or the ascertainability of damages.
The only accepted rule approaching the ascertainability test is in the
area of trespass to real property. Where a trespass occurs courts have
generally held that the trespass is complete when committed and the
statute of limitations begins to run at that time, but under some cir-
cumstances there is a continuing wrong for which the plaintiff may
maintain several successive actions. 62 These cases present the question
of whether the plaintiff must bring a single action for all past and
future damages within the relevant statute of limitations or whether
the plaintiff can institute a new action following each injury. The an-
swer generally depends on the likelihood of future damages, deter-
mined by examining the permanence of the damaging condition and
asking whether the defendant is likely to prevent future damages, for
example by more careful maintenance or use of his land.63 If future
injury is fairly certain to occur, if the damaging condition is rela-
tively permanent, and if future injuries are not likely to be abated,
only one cause of action will lie; past and future damages must be
claimed regardless of the degree of precision with which future dam-
ages may be ascertained.
One could argue that an antitrust violation creates a "continuing
antitrust trespass" and that whenever new harm occurs from past con-
duct a new cause of action accrues; but antitrust cases are hardly
analogous to cases involving continuous trespasses. An antitrust viola-
tion that has occurred and terminated is certainly not abatable, since
the violator has no control over future damages to the victim. In addi-
tion, future injury is typically certain; only the amount is speculative.
Prospective damages caused by an antitrust violation are more like
future pain and suffering or wage losses from a personal injury than a
continuing trespass. It is unlikely that Congress intended to apply the
continuing trespass rule to antitrust actions, particularly since there is
no mention of this procrustean effort in the legislative history of
section 4B.
Thus, Congress seems to have intended that the four-year statute of
limitations for treble damage actions should begin to run from the
date of actual injury caused by an antitrust violation, except in con-
61 See, e.g., Acker v. Sorenson, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969).
62 See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 74-75 (4th ed. 1971); Note, 33 TEX. L. REv.
753 (1955). A commonly used example is a dam that periodically floods adjoining land.
63 See, e.g., Hilton v. Duke Power Co., 254 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1958).
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spiracy cases where it should not begin to run until the victim knows
or reasonably should know of the violation and his injury.64
IV. SECTION 4B OF THE CLAYTON ACT: POLICY PERSPECTIVE
The ascertainability standard and similar rules are also undesirable
as a matter of policy. The considerations that prompted those rules-
deterrence of antitrust violations and compensation of antitrust victims
-are certainly significant. In this context, however, there are counter-
vailing considerations that outweigh those factors. 65
The principal considerations miltitating against an ascertainability
rule were articulated in the House and Senate reports on section 4B.
Such a rule "may tend to prolong stale claims, unduly impair efficient
business operations, and overburden the calendars of the courts."6 6
For example, Zenith alleged that it was illegally prevented from enter-
ing the Canadian market. The Court suggested hypothetically that
Zenith might have been unable to attain its maximum share of a freely
competitive market for ten years after the end of actionable conduct
by Hazeltine.6 7 Since the amount of Zenith's lost profits would depend
on its ultimate share of a free Canadian market, its damages would re-
main speculative for ten years. The courts would thus be left with the
difficult task of determining the time at which Zenith had attained
its ultimate maximum share of a freely competitive Canadian market.
Presumably some share of the market would have to be held by Zenith
for a few years in order for that determination to be made. In addi-
tion, Zenith would have four years after the date on which its share be-
came ascertainable to file suit. The net result may be to allow a private
antitrust action over fifteen years after the alleged violation ceased-
definitely a stale claim.
During those years, uncertainty about future damage claims might
64 See text at note 46 supra. Two commentators have suggested another approach that
has no support in the congressional consideration of the statute of limitations in section
4B. Note, 38 J. AIR L. & Com. 67, 76-79 (1972); Note, 49 N.C.L. Rxv. 731, 736-38 (1971).
They suggest that an initial action be allowed to settle the question of liability, which
will not be relitigated. The plaintiff would then be free to bring any number of later ac-
tions to recover damages that were caused by the adjudged violation but previously held
speculative. See text at note 69 infra.
65 Similarly, policy considerations have spawned the standing doctrine that prevents
large groups of people injured by antitrust violations from bringing suit under the Clayton
Act. See, e.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 923, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1014 (1970); Nationwide Auto Appraiser Serv., Inc. v.
Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
66 H.R. REP. No. 422, supra note 4, at 8. See text at note 48 supra.
67 401 U.S. at 341.
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prevent Hazeltine from operating at maximum efficiency.0 8 Hazeltine's
problem may be more serious because it has no clear idea of the
amount of possible damages; if it had a clear idea, the damages involved
would presumably not be speculative. In the extreme case of hopelessly
speculative damages, the statute of limitations will never run, and the
potential defendant will be left in the unenviable position of judging
which damages are hopelessly speculative and therefore unworthy of
further concern.
Finally, the ascertainability standard may foster fruitless litigation in
cases in which damages are speculative. Even if the courts impose an
arbitrary limit on the number of times a plaintiff can sue on the same
cause of action, judicial inefficiency must result. When the suit is first
filed, the court must examine the evidence to determine whether the
damages are speculative. Each time another suit is filed the same exam-
ination must be undertaken and new evidence of damages added. The
total inefficiency will depend on the number of times plaintiffs are per-
mitted to sue after being dismissed for seeking speculative damages.
It has been suggested that these problems could be eliminated by
having the issue of liability settled in an initial action and allowing
speculative damages to be recovered by later actions in which the
question of liability need not be relitigated. 9 Permitting plaintiffs to
continually bring fruitless claims for speculative damages is obviously
a waste of judicial resources, although the risk of this occurring is
limited by litigation costs. The courts might also limit the number of
suits that could be based on the initial liability determination, but
this result is unsatisfactory because of its obvious legislative appearance.
Most important, it is not at all certain that this proposal would actually
ameliorate the problems at which it is directed. It is entirely possible
that the damage determination in most cases is at least as complex as
the liability question. If this is the case, the proposed solution would
not remove the prospect of repeatedly reviewing complex evidence
when damages are sought before becoming judicially ascertainable.
In addition to these difficulties with the ascertainability rule, insofar
as it is justified as dampening the adverse effects of the statute of limita-
tions on private plaintiffs, it is unnecessary.70 Story Parchment Co. v.
68 See text at notes 31-33 supra.
69 See note 64 supra.
70 There are also two categories of actions involving claims for anticipated lost profits
in which Zenith is inapposite because the plaintiff's performance for years after the ter-
mination of the illegal conduct will not be examined to determine what its share of the
relevant market would have been absent the violation. First, the plaintiff may have been
in the relevant market prior to the illegal conduct. Using data about the plaintiff's
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Paterson Parchment Paper Co.71 and Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures,
Inc.72 made clear that the degree of proof required to prove the amount
of damages in an antitrust case is considerably lower than that which is
needed to establish injury.73 Other concepts, including the doctrine
of fraudulent conspiracy,74 the tolling provision of section 5(b),75 de-
laying the running of the statute of limitations until the violation is
or should be discovered, 76 and the usual length of time between the
violations and their detection in antitrust cases, 77 extend the actual
performance before the violation, its market share without the illegal conduct can be
estimated with sufficient judicial precision. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,
327 U.S. 251 (1946). This method of calculation cannot be employed if the plaintiff
recently entered the market or if the market structure and conditions in the "before"
period differed substantially from the period of the impact of the defendant's conduct.
See Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ANTrIRUSr BULL.
497, 506 (1972).
Zenith is also unnecessary for the plaintiff when its market share absent the violation can
be estimated by comparing the performance of a similar entity not adversely affected by
the illegal conduct-freqiently one of the defendants-during the period in which the
violations occurred. A similar test is one in which an estimate of the plaintiff's share in
the competitive market is based on his performance in a comparable market. For example,
the trial court calculated Zenith's share of the Canadian market in the absence of the
patent pool based on Zeniths actual share of the American market in 1959-1963. Thus,
despite analytical weaknesses in the above measurements, where the plaintiff meets their
requirements Zenith is unnecessary.
71 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
72 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
73 In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946), the Court stated:
EElven where the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more precise co,-
putation, the jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or guesswork. But
the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on relevant
data, and render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances "juries are allowed to
act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof." ... Any other
rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at the expense of his
victim. It would be an inducement to make wrongdoing so effective and complete in
every case as to preclude any recovery, by rendering the measure of damages uncer-
tain. Failure to apply it would mean that the more grevious the wrong done, the less
likelihood there would be a recovery.
The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his wrong has created.
327 U.S. at 264-65 (citations omitted). Bigelow has been credited with instigating a
marked increase in private treble damage actions. Colen, Procedural Directions in Anti-
trust Treble Damage Litigation: An Overview of Changing Judicial Attitudes, 17 ANTr-
TRusr BULL. 997, 998-99 (1972) (surveying procedural changes in antitrust law that have
aided private plaintiffs).
74 The fraudulent concealment by the violator of a cause of action constitutes an excep-
tion to the statute of limitations, postponing the running of the statute of limitations
until the victim discovers or reasonably should discover the cause of action. See, e.g.,
Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528 (1885).
75 Clayton Act § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970). See note 16 supra.
76 See text at note 46 supra.
77 See Wheeler, Antitrust Treble-Damage Actions: Do They Work?, 61 CArLnE. L. Rv.
-, - (1973).
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period of time in which suit may be brought far beyond four years
from the date on which the actionable conduct occurred.
In addition to these drawbacks in the ascertainability test, the most
significant factor may be the absence of compensating benefits. Deter-
rence is not likely to be increased by this attempt to facilitate recovery
in private actions.78 It is inconceivable that a potential antitrust viola-
tor will try to guess whether damages caused by some action will be
held speculative when deciding whether possibly illegal conduct is
worthwhile. The unlikelihood that a potential antitrust violator will
consider the added risk created by the ascertainability test distinguishes
that standard from the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, an excep-
tion that Congress clearly intended to incorporate into the Clayton
Act.79 The added risk that the potential violator might face because of
the ascertainability test is totally imponderable, turning on such fac-
tors as the difficulty of proving the extent of damages in antitrust cases,
the nature of the potential victims, and the presence or absence of
factors that would allow the potential victims to prove their damages.
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment, on the other hand, clearly
increases the risk for the potential violator, because it merely asks
whether the violator took steps to conceal his violation from his vic-
tims, a question within the knowledge of the violator and susceptible
to proof by direct or circumstantial evidence.
Judicial efficiency also favors adoption of a fraudulent concealment
exception and rejection of the ascertainability test. The doctrine of
fraudulent concealment involves traditional legal issues concerning
defendants' conduct and the reasonable availability of information that
did inform, or should have informed, plaintiffs of the existence of an
antitrust violation and their injuries. The ascertainability test, how-
ever, requires the courts to scrutinize complex and ambiguous eco-
nomic evidence and to ask whether a hypothetical trial court at an
earlier point in time would have held the alleged damages speculative
had the plaintiff sued at that time.8 0
78 In addition to the reasons discussed below, so few injured parties receive compensa-
tion under the existing statutory scheme that it is unlikely that the extension of the
statute of limitations provided by Zenith will substantially increase antitrust victims'
compensation. Id. at 000.
79 See text at note 46 supra. In addition to the policy reasons discussed below for dis-
tinguishing between the ascertainability and discovery notions, there is the obvious differ-
ence in support in the legislative history.
80 In short, neither legislative history nor general policy considerations favor the ascer-
tainability test as strongly as the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The simple fact that
the purpose underlying the two notions-facilitation of private antitrust actions to promote
deterrence-may be the same is hardly a valid reason to adopt both. The question to be
addressed is whether antitrust plaintiffs should be helped and, if so, to what extent. The
policy arguments advanced here justify drawing a line between these two doctrines.
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Finally, all actions in which plaintiffs seek to recover lost future
profits involve the problems that the Court in Zenith attempted to
ameliorate for antitrust plaintiffs. Unless antitrust actions possess some
unique quality to justify more favored treatment than other actions
in which businessmen have been injured tortiously, antitrust actions
should be treated no differently than other actions. This article has
recognized one possible difference-a greater emphasis on the deterrent
purpose of antitrust suits81-but that purpose is adequately served by
other liberalizing rules peculiar to antitrust law,82 and Zenith does not
provide any further deterrence that might be thought necessary.
V. CONCLUSION
Many weaknesses in the existing antitrust enforcement scheme pre-
vent the laws from being as effective a deterrent and compensatory
mechanism as might be desirable. Because most of the needed changes
ought to be accomplished legislatively, and because Congress has been
slow to recognize this need, the Supreme Court has too often faced the
task of giving real substance to antitrust damage actions-the only tool
for achieving compensation for antitrust injury and one of the few
means of achieving deterrence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc. represents another attempt by the Court to effectuate the
goals of antitrust laws. That case formulated a rule in which the statute
of limitations for antitrust damage actions begins to run only after the
plaintiff's damages have become ascertainable. Congress apparently in-
tended, however, that the statute should begin to run from the date
of actual injury, except in cases of conspiracy where it begins to run
when the actionable conduct is or reasonably should be discovered.
In addition to the basic rule that courts should respect congressional
intent, there are major policy considerations that favor the congressional
rule over the ascertainability test. In the future, therefore, a cause of
action should be held to accrue, for the purposes of section 4B of the
Clayton Act, on the date on which the actionable conduct occurs, sub-
ject to extension only where the statute is tolled by section 5(b) of the
Clayton Act or the conduct has gone undiscovered.
81 See text at notes 43-44 supra.
82 See text and notes at notes 71-77 supra.
